This paper presents the discus sions, issues, and recom men da tions devel oped by a working group on Homeland Secu rity dur ing a workshop on Streamlining National Secu rity, which was conducted at the U.S. Army War Col lege from 5 to 7 Sep tem ber 2001.
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state and an oppor tun ist major-power adver sary. The dilem mas included a bio-terrorism threat, an orches trated mass refu gee flow across our borders, cyberterrorism, and the threat of substan tial para-military oper a tions within our borders. The sce nario challenged the concept that terror ism within the terri to rial U.S. is a crimi nal act and not an act of war.
This paper summa rizes the findings of the Homeland Secu rity group. A simi lar CSL paper is available regard ing the Overseas sessions of the workshop.
A Multi-tiered Require ment
The forum began with the central real iza tion that terri to rial secu rity is a national, not federal, respon si bil ity. The inte gra tion of state and local efforts with federal response mecha nisms is essen tial to an effi cient and effec tive response to either the threat of or the results of domes tic terror ism. Atten dees further real ized that the most perva sive and endur ing effect would be re al ized by an inter na tional effort-as opposed to a unilat eral effort on the part of the United States-to deter, prevent, pre empt, and respond to terror ism. Accord ingly, delib er a tions at the workshop were divided among discus sion groups devoted to inter na tional, federal, and state and local consid er ations.
In ter na tional
Both the bio log i cal threat and the forced refu gee flow portions of the scenario led partici pants to call for assis tance and support from an inter na tional coali tion. Partic i pants suggested that such actions would "get out ahead" of the perpe tra tors, ini ti at ing a worldwide human i tar ian condem na tion of the threats, even before their imple men ta tion, and turning the perpe tra tors into inter na tional pari ahs.
Par tic i pants called for a two-phased policy approach to the WMD threat posed by the sce nario. The first phase would call for the devel op ment of a Conse quence Manage ment Proto col (in this case, a "Bio" proto col), designed to network the combined de tec tion and contain ment capa bil i ties of the world commu nity. The second phase would call for a "bio-threat response treaty," with the impli ca tion of a mili tary re sponse to the employ ment, or threat of employ ment, of bio log i cal agents. Atten dees sug gested that the first measure repre sented more of a human i tar ian approach to the over all problem and would therefore draw quicker support. In turn, however, they sug gested that the proposed treaty and the mili tary response it implied would be a nat u ral exten sion to the former commit ment.
In terms of infra struc ture, atten dees called for strengthen ing exist ing partner ships with the United Nations and for expand ing ex ist ing agreements with such regional orga ni za tions as the OAS and ASEAN. In addi tion, par tic i pants called for the devel op ment of formal rela tion ships between the Depart ment of State and nongovernmental orga niza tions whose functional focus could include human i tar ian inter ests, envi ron men tal protec tion, and other concerns jeop ar dized by WMD terror ism.
Fed eral
Dis cus sions began on the basis of two "real iza tions," neither of which were neces sar ily in tu itive to the predom i nantly mili tary mix of the assem bly. First, the Depart ment of Defense, in most instances, will not be "in charge" of homeland secu rity func tions; its primary role will be in support of other lead federal agencies. Second, the in ter agency process of dealing with home land secu rity will call for partner ships among agencies that, hereto fore, have had little to no tradi tional inter ac tion.
Build ing on that founda tion, the atten dees suggested a three-step process in reframing the in fra struc ture to deter, defend against and respond to the multi-faceted aspects of threats against the domes tic front.
1 The first step is to construct a compre hen sive national strategy for homeland secu rity, identi fy ing the roles and missions of the diverse agencies of the federal gov ern ment, address ing compo nents of the domes tic threat, and coor di nat ing federal, state, and local efforts in times of crisis. The second step is to estab lish a central orga ni za tion in charge of oversee ing homeland se cu rity functions within the Exec u tive Branch of the govern ment, bringing a central ized focus and author ity, includ ing budget ary appor tion ment, to the dis pa rate efforts of the numer ous (more than forty) agencies currently involved in some aspect of domes tic prepared ness. An in di vid ual appointed by the Presi dent and confirmed by the Senate would head this agency, pro vid ing both the author ity and re spon si bil ity those actions entail.
Step three would call for that office, in coop er ation with both the Justice Depart ment and the National Intel li gence Council, to conduct a compre hen sive threat-risk assess ment of the vulner a bil ity to terror ist attack within the United States and of the appro pri ate capa bil i ties available and required to over come that vulner a bil ity. From this mea sured analy sis, the nation would be better prepared to construct a reason able "all-threat" response within the confines of what will always be a resource-constrained envi ron ment.
Par tic i pants addressed the need for policy changes in several areas. Measures to fulfill in tel li gence require ments for domestic oper a tions, currently restricted by law, marked one area of discus sion. The need to better inte grate, and as neces sary de clas sify, intel li gence for dissem i na tion to meet federal, state, and local require ments was another area, as was the need to meld not only "tradi tional," but crimi nal, and even medi cal intel li gence into a national net work designed to serve both interagency and inter gov ern men tal (i.e., federal, state, and local) require ments. This fed into further discus sions on the need to in form the public at large-not only at the time of a given occur rence, in order to miti gate the conse quences-but also to edu cate the public ahead of time with respect to poten tial domes tic threats and responses to the same. This call for infor ma tion and edu ca tion recom mended a partner ship between the govern ment and private media to provide the most acces si ble and per va sive means of reaching the Ameri can people in a state of emergency.
From a solely mili tary perspec tive, atten dees identi fied three areas of conten tion that mer ited further inves ti ga tion. The first area had to do with poten tial changes in the orga ni za tional para digm of the National Guard. Some partic i pants questioned whether the posture of the Guard, gener ally mirror ing the structure, capa bil i ties, and mis sion of the active compo nent, would re flect the best utili za tion of the Guard in the new era. Several atten dees supported the rec om men da tion that the Guard should take on homeland secu rity within the United States as a primary mission; in that regard, some suggested that the Guard could develop unique "Homeland Secu rity skills" (not unlike the Guard's WMD-CST's), which could also be config ured in "ex port able packages" should a require ment surface overseas. Other partic i pants opined that, while the Guard could/should be prepared to exe cute the homeland secu rity mission, it should not be at the expense of the compo nent's tradi tional "national re serve" mission.
The second area of conten tion had to do with the mili tary's contin u ing policy of locat ing so much of the nation's combat support and combat service support capa bil i ties in the Reserves. While acknowl edg ing the po lit i cal advan tages of mobi liz ing the public's support along with the Reserves whenever those forces were commit ted, partic ipants wondered if contin u ing a pol icy that requires a signif i cant Reserve call up for every signif i cant appli ca tion of the nation's mili tary power was either nec es sary or prudent.
In an inter est ing contrast, partic i pants warned against routinely employ ing ac tive duty forces in domes tic envi rons. Two reasons were offered for this guarded approach. First, the idea of the armed forces exer cis ing any degree of ju ris dic tion over Ameri can citi zens summons up a historic revul sion in the na tion's collec tive psyche, and should therefore be avoided in all but the most ex treme circum stances-such as war. Second, by routinely tying our active duty compo nent to the domes tic mission, we may jeopar dize their ability to main tain an overseas oper a tional capa bil ity; the ability to "fight and win our Na tion's wars" should also be a primary focus for our forces.
A final, overarch ing obser va tion from the Federal working group was that, while there is much that needs to be done in bol ster ing our domes tic secu rity stance, our first step should be a complete assess ment of exist ing capa bil i ties, and those ca pa bil i ties must be made known across the inter agency and inter gov ern men tal spectrum of respon si bil i ties. Finding the "fault lines" will only be possi ble by identi fy ing, and exer cis ing our strengths.
State and Local
The State working group reflected the same need for assess ment in their opening posi tion. States and munic i pal i ties must first assess the capa bil i ties contained within their own infra struc tures. From there they may more accu rately ascer tain the "gaps" they need to fill and those they need help filling.
Re in forcing the obser va tions and recom men da tions from the Federal working group, the State and local group paid partic u lar at ten tion to the need for inter gov ern men tal coop er a tion, and the group called for frequent and wide-ranging exer cises involv ing federal, state, and local enti ties to develop the type of "routine response" that will be required in an emergency. Atten dees went further in contend ing that a compel ling require ment exists to create a DOD and state train ing and exer cise program devoted to homeland secu rity. This would serve to famil iar ize state offi cials with the capacity of the mili tary's support mech a nism, and it would famil iar ize the mili tary with state needs.
The subject of coor di nat ing and recon cil ing state and federal inter ests stimu lated signif i cant dis cus sion during the workshop. Given a national emergency, some partic i pants voiced con cern over retain ing control of state assets (to include the National Guard) during a crisis. Par tic i pants held that agreements between state, local, and federal agencies would have to be made regard ing reten tion of unity of command within the state during a crisis, and that these agree ments would reflect expe ri ence gener ated by frequent inter ac tion long before a crisis oc curs. Simi larly, the impor tance of emergency manage ment assis tance compacts (EMACs) be tween states, partic u larly within a given region, was frequently conveyed. Concern over the pos si bil ity of a Presi dent being too quick to feder al ize assets was also raised. Some par tic ipants suggested that now might be the time to inves ti gate occa sions when (in direct contrast) a state author ity might assume command and control of federal, Title 10 forces.
Con clu sion
Cur rent delib er a tions in Washing ton bear witness to the fact that defense of the homeland may require new poli cies, new in fra struc ture, and even new laws. But before any of these are approached, a full under standing of exist ing capa bil i ties and of their inte gra tion within current inter agency and inter gov ern men tal structures may mark the truest and most prudent course for us to follow on our journey back to homeland secu rity.
The Center for Strate gic Leader ship will pursue the devel op ment and exam i na tion of these issues through vari ous venues and fo rums. It is hoped that the efforts of the partic i pants at this workshop and in follow-on ef forts will ulti mately contrib ute to a sig nif i cantly improved U.S. national secu rity structure. ******** This publi ca tion and other CSL publi ca tions can be found online at: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/pub li ca tions.htm. ******** The views expressed in this report are those of the partic i pants and do not neces sar ily reflect offi cial policy or posi tion of the United States Army War College, the Depart ment of the Army, the Depart ment of Defense, or any other Depart ment or Agency within the U.S. Govern ment. Further, these views do not reflect uniform agreement among exer cise partic i pants. This report is cleared for public release; distri bu tion is unlim ited.
